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Abstract: Using a New Keynesian model subject to misspecifications, we examine the 
accountability issue in a framework of delegation where government and private agents are 
uncertain about the central bank’s preference for model robustness. We show that, in the 
benchmark case of full transparency, the optimal inflation targeting weight (or penalty) is 
decreasing with the preference for robustness. Departing from the benchmark equilibrium, the 
central bank has then incentive to be less transparent in order to reduce the optimal inflation 
targeting weight and thus to become more independent vis-à-vis the government. We also find 
that greater opacity will increase the sensibility of inflation and model misspecification to the 
inflation shock but will decrease that of output-gap. Since macroeconomic volatility could be 
increased or decreased under more opacity, there could exist in some cases a trade-off 
between the level and the variability of inflation (and output gap). Persistent inflation shocks 
could be associated with a higher inflation targeting weight as well as a higher sensibility of 
inflation and output gap to the inflation shock but a lower sensibility of model 
misspecification.    
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The New-Keynesian approach to macroeconomic modelling is used extensively in the 
monetary policy literature for almost a decade now. It has produced several important insights 
in the analysis of monetary policy and is now commonly applied to provide policy 
prescriptions (Clarida et al., 1999). Most of the studies focus on specific topics and stay 
unconnected between them. In particular, recent developments on optimal monetary policy in 
forward-looking models have explored separately various notions of transparency and model 
robustness.
1  
Several studies examine issues related to monetary policy transparency in the New-
Keynesian framework, while assuming that the central bank knows the true structure of the 
economy. Cukierman (2002) has demonstrated that it may be rational for the central bank to 
de-emphasize a high flexibility parameter and asymmetric preferences that might raise 
inflationary expectations. For Jensen (2002), greater transparency about control errors means 
that policy has a larger impact on future expectations and, via this channel, on current 
equilibrium inflation. This leads the central bank to be less aggressive in its policy actions. 
Eijffinger and Tesfaselassie (2007) find that, in the absence of uncertainty about the central 
bank’s targets, advance disclosure of central bank’s private information on future shocks 
impairs stabilization of current inflation and output. 
To the difference of previous studies, Walsh (2003) introduces accountability issues 
through an incentive scheme that puts a weight on the inflation target objective of the central 
bank. He has shown that the fundamental trade-off between accountability and stabilization 
                                                           
1 Pioneered by Cukierman and Metzler (1986), transparency issue has been examined in other types of models 
both theoretically and empirically by Nolan and Schaling (1998), Faust and Svensson (2001), Chortareas et al. 
(2002), Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), Demertzis and Hughes Hallet (2007), among others.   3
depends on the degree of transparency concerning the central bank’s output-gap target, 
defined as the ability to monitor the central bank’s performance.  
Nevertheless, as any model, New-Keynesian models rest on a set of assumptions that 
may or may not be good approximations of economies. Without the possibility of having a 
complete description of reality, a policymaker is likely to prefer basing policy on principles 
that are also valid if the assumptions on which the model is founded differ from reality. In 
other words, policy prescriptions should be robust to reasonable deviations from the 
benchmark model.  
The literature on monetary policy robustness has been mainly developed into two 
directions. The first one leads to what has been called robustly optimal instrument rules 
(Svensson and Woodford, 2004; Giannoni and Woodford, 2003a, 2003b). As these instrument 
rules do not depend on the specification of the generating processes of the exogenous 
disturbances in the model, they are therefore robust to misspecification in these processes. 
The second one, initiated by Hansen and Sargent (2003, 2007), corresponds to robust control 
approach to the decision problem of agents who face model uncertainty. In the sense of 
Hansen and Sargent, robust monetary policies are designed to perform well in worst-case 
scenarios. These policies arise as the equilibrium in a game between the monetary authorities 
and an evil agent who chooses model misspecification to make the authorities look as bad as 
possible. While these two approaches to robust policies appear quite distinct, Walsh (2004) 
has demonstrated that both approaches lead to exactly the same implicit instrument rule for 
the monetary authorities in a standard forward-looking new Keynesian model.
2 
The role of model robustness has been neglected until now in the literature on 
transparency. In practice, central banks (especially inflation targeting central banks) seem to 
                                                           
2 A third approach to robustness considers what is called structured Knightian uncertainty. Here, the uncertainty 
is assumed to be located in one or more specific parameters of the model (Onatski and Stock, 2002; Giannoni,   4
publish plenty of analysis on their models and policy rules robustness.
3 However, they are 
confronted with a dilemma. A simple model may give an advantage in communication with 
the public, but it can be criticized for not fitting the data well.  
One response to such criticism is to design more complex models that are able to better 
capture the behaviour of macroeconomic variables. Such models gain in realism but lose in 
tractability. An alternative route is to acknowledge that the simple model is a misspecified 
description of reality and to design policy taking this misspecification into account. In other 
words, the central bank does not know the true structure of the economy.  
Disclosure of the knowledge about the true economic structure could significantly 
influence the strategic interactions between central bank and private agents. In particular, 
monetary policy makers might use strategically their private information in order to gain 
benefits in terms of output stabilization. 
The robustness approaches assume that government and private agents know exactly the 
preference parameters, in particular the preference for robustness of the central bank, while 
the latter does not know exactly the true model of the economy. However, in the transparency 
literature, government and private agents are generally uncertain about the preferences of the 
central bank.  
If the central bank could have incentives to not communicate its preferences associated 
with its inflation and output targets, why does it have then incentives to communicate its 
preference for model robustness? In order to answer this question, we consider in this paper 
simultaneously the issues of transparency and model robustness in a framework of delegation 
similar to that used by Walsh (2003), in assuming that the central bank doesn’t know exactly 
the true model of the economy and can be opaque about its preference for model robustness.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2002, 2007). Another current of research studies the robustness of a monetary policy rule across competing 
reference models. See for example McCallum (1999), and Levin and Williams (2003). 
3 For example, the central banks of New Zealand, Canada and United Kingdom.    5
Transparency about the central bank’s preference for model robustness, following the 
terminology defined by Geraats (2002), can be considered as political transparency which 
refers to openness about policy objectives and institutional arrangements that clarify the 
motives of monetary policymakers.
4  
Models focusing on monetary policy transparency typically consider two players, the 
monetary authority and the private sector. Departing from this approach, some authors study 
the relationship between central bank transparency and institutional design (Walsh, 2003; 
Hughes Hallett and Weymark, 2005; Hughes Hallett and Libich, 2009). Our study is closely 
linked to this literature. 
We assume that the true model of the economy lies in some neighbourhood of the 
reference model, and we analyze how monetary policy should be designed in order to work 
reasonably well for all models inside this neighbourhood. The robust policymaker is supposed 
to be unable to formulate a probability distribution over plausible models and hence designs 
policy for the worst possible outcome within a pre-specified set of models. Its decision 
problem is solved using the robust control techniques (Hansen and Sargent, 2007). 
The interactions between transparency and robustness and their implication for 
accountability will modify the private expectations and therefore affect the government’s 
delegation decision and the incentive of the central bank to be transparent or not about its 
preferences for model robustness.  
The accountability issue in this paper is solved through an incentive scheme that takes the 
form of a quadratic contract between the government and the central bank.
5 We consider the 
                                                           
4 Geraats (2002) defines five motives for central bank transparency such as political transparency, economic 
transparency, procedural transparency, policy transparency and operational transparency. To simplify, we do not 
consider other kind of transparency motives discussed in the literature. It is to note that the economic 
transparency (such as publication of models) must not be confused with the transparency about the preference 
for model robustness (political transparency).  
5 We remark that the accountability issue could alternatively be addressed by the conservative central banker 
approach due to Rogoff (1985) and the inflation contracting approach developed in Walsh (1995). The effects of   6
government as the principal and the central bank as the agent. The central bank is delegated to 
attain  the inflation target defined by the government. The failure of the central bank to 
achieve the target is associated with an inflation targeting weight (or penalty).  
Under inflation targeting, the weight placed on achieving the target is a measure of the 
power of the incentive structure facing the central bank. Incentive schemes that are too low 
powered fail to ensure accountability, while ones that are too high powered can distort policy 
responses to changing economic conditions.  
The optimal inflation targeting weight, which plays the role of Rogoff’s optimal degree of 
conservatism, conciliates the need for accountability with the imperfect ability to monitor the 
central bank. If the information about the preference for model robustness on which it bases 
policy is private and publicly unverifiable, monitoring will be imperfect. When monitoring is 
incomplete due to imperfect information or lack of transparency, it is optimal to place less 
weight on achieving the inflation target to avoid distorting stabilization policy.  
Kilponen (2003) has also considered a delegation framework including robustness issues 
in the Barro-Gordon framework. Considering that the central bank is perfectly transparent, 
he has found that the model uncertainty implies more aggressive policy responses. His 
simulation result shows that the more uncertain the central bank’s model is, the more 
conservative the central should be. While we confirm his first result, our analysis finds a 
closed-form solution which implies the opposite of his simulation result. This divergence 
may be explained by the assumption adopted by Kilponen according to which the 
government is equally subject to model uncertainty.
6 Furthermore, we analytically 
consider the implications of opacity. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
transparency have been examined in the framework of delegation with linear central bank contracts by Beetsma 
and Jensen (1998), Muscatelli (1998) and Chortareas and Miller (2003). 
6 While this is an interesting assumption, it would make his model non-tractable. Since Kilponen has not 
given a closed-form solution of the optimal inflation targeting weight, we are not able to further compare 
with his results.    7
The present study has some strong implications for the institutional design of monetary 
policy which can be compared with some results obtained by Hughes Hallett and Libich 
(2009). They examine the relationship between explicit inflation targets, communication, and 
central bank independence and have shown that goal-independence is inversely related to 
goal transparency. In our framework, the central bank already lacks goal independence as it 
is delegated by the government. Our analysis implies that central bank goal independence 
is suboptimal because, choosing its own degree of transparency about the robustness 
parameter, the central bank tends to prefer, under a range of circumstances, opacity to 
transparency, leading to inferior macroeconomic outcomes. 
In the next section, we present the basic model. In the section after, we solve the model to 
obtain the optimal inflation targeting weight under full transparency about the preference for 
robustness. The effects of opacity on inflation targeting weight, monetary policy robustness as 
well as the macroeconomic performance and volatility are examined in section 4. In section 5, 
we discuss the implications of a serially correlated inflation shock for macroeconomic 
performance, monetary policy robustness and optimal inflation targeting weight. The last 
section concludes.  
 
2. The model 
 
Our description of economic environment follows the standard New-Keynesian model 
based on optimizing private sector behaviour and nominal rigidities that has been used 
extensively in the recent literature on monetary policy (Clarida et al. 1999). 
Instead of formulating monetary policy explicitly in terms of control over the nominal 
interest rate, we simplify by treating the output gap, i.e. output relative to the flexible-price 
equilibrium level, as the instrument of monetary policy. We could also consider that the   8
central bank sets the interest rate in order to attain output and inflation targets in taking 
account of the goods market equilibrium condition. However, this condition is 
neglected, similarly to Walsh (2003), in the present paper without affecting our results. 
In the following, we use only the New-Keynesian Philips curve extended to take account 
of model misspecifications faced by the central bank. It is completed by a description of 
principal-agent framework where central bank preference for robustness is not perfectly 
observable by the government and the public.  
 
2.1 The economy 
The economy is characterized by a forward-looking Phillips curve: 
t t t t t e x + δ + π Ε β = π +1 , with  1 0 < β < ,  0 > δ ,     (1) 
where  t π  is the inflation rate,  1 + π Ε t t  the private sector’s expectation of future inflation,  t x 
the output gap,  t e  a serially uncorrelated inflation or cost-push shock, and β the discount 
rate. The parameter δ  is the output-gap elasticity of inflation and captures the effects of the 
gap on real marginal costs and marginal cost on inflation. 
While the central bank considers the forward-looking Phillips curve described by equation 
(1) as the most likely specification, it realizes that the true Phillips curve may deviate from the 
benchmark, although it is unable to specify a probability distribution of deviations. To model 
such misspecification, we introduce in equation (1) a second type of disturbance, denoted by 
t h.  In the sense of Hansen and Sargent (2007), the disturbance is controlled by a fictitious 
“evil agent” representing the policymaker’s worst fears concerning model misspecification. 
Thus, the forward-looking Phillips curve with misspecification is given by 
t t t t t t h e x + + + Ε = + δ π β π 1 .                       (2)   9
The disturbance  t h  is not a shock that can be described by a law of probability distribution. 
Its value will depend on central bank’s preference for model robustness.  
The robust policy is designed to perform well for one of the least likely outcomes of the 
model. This model is within a pre-specified set of models, which is chosen so that the 
policymaker cannot statistically reject any of the models inside the set. Throughout this 
analysis, we focus on marginal amounts of robustness, so monetary policy is robust against 
very small degrees of misspecification. In the case of major misspecification, the evil agent 
will be able to overturn any relationship in the model. Consequently, the basic relationship in 
equation (2) is not a good description of reality (Leitemo and Söderström, 2008). 
It is to notice that introducing the IS curve will not change the equilibrium solution. As 
shown by Leitemo and Söderström (2008), the central bank only worries about model 
misspecification in the Phillips curve since the optimal misspecification in the IS equation is 
always zero in the closed economy. In effect, the central bank does not fear such 
misspecification in the IS equation because it is able to offset any misspecification by an 
appropriate adjustment of the interest rate so that its loss function is not affected by these 
interest rate movements.  
 
2.2 Policy objectives with preference for robustness 
In order to study the incentive of the central bank to be more or less transparent, we 
distinguish between the objective functions of the principal, referred to as the government (or 
the public), and the agent, the central bank. The role of the government will be to design the 
targeting regime under which the central bank conducts policy. The central bank is delegated 
to attain the target defined by the government. In order to ensure the accountability of the 
central bank, its failure to achieve the target is associated with an inflation targeting weight 
(or penalty).   10
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t x E L π λ β ,   0 > λ ,     (3) 
where  λ is the relative weight placed on the output-gap objective. Social loss depends on 
output gap and inflation variability. 
In the model of Walsh (2003), the central bank is subject to political pressures for 
economic expansions, captured by allowing for random fluctuations in the central bank’s 
output-gap target. In the present model, by eliminating this source of uncertainty about central 
bank preferences and hence the relating inflation bias which is not central to our 
investigation, we focus on the implications of a new kind of uncertainty concerning the 
preference for model robustness. Furthermore, discretionary policy implemented to minimize 
(3) would not be subject to an inflation bias due to the overly ambitious output-gap target 
common in the Barro-Gordon framework.  
The central bank is assumed to minimize a standard objective function which is quadratic 
in deviations of inflation and output gap from their zero target levels. In order to design robust 
monetary policy, the central bank takes into account a certain degree of model 
misspecification by minimizing its objective function in the worst possible model within a 
given set of plausible models. As it is common in the robust control literature, we assume that 
the central bank, depending on its preference for model robustness, allocates a budget 
2 χ  to 
the evil agent who creates misspecifications under the following budget constraint:  









t h E χ ρ .                                        (4) 
Following Hansen and Sargent (2007), the robust monetary policy is obtained by solving 
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h x E L
i t i t
θ π τ λ β ,   (5) 
subject to the misspecified New Keynesian Phillips curve described in equation (2) and 
the evil agent’s budget constraint (4). In the loss function (5), τ  is the inflation targeting 
weight (or penalty), which plays the role of Rogoff’s degree of conservatism. θ  denotes the 
preference for robustness which is known only to the central bank, but neither to the 
government nor to the private sector. It determines the set of models available to the evil 
agent against which the policymaker wants to be robust.  
When taking their decision, the government and the private agents can make guesses 
about the value of θ . We assume that they have constant beliefs about this parameter, that are 
normally distributed with mean value θ  and variance 
2
θ σ .  
The last term in (5) is specific to the robust control techniques adopted by the central 
bank. As τ  could be negative, to ensure the consistency of the loss function, we assume that  
0 1 > +τ ,          ( 6 )  
i.e. the deviation from inflation target constitutes always a loss.  
The central bank and the evil agent play a Nash game, so their choice is optimal given the 
other player’s choice.
7 The central bank thus sets the output level to minimize the value of its 
intertemporal loss function, while the evil agent sets its controls to maximize the central 
bank’s loss, given the constraints on misspecifications. 
The robustness parameter, θ , is inversely related to the evil agent’s budget. From 
inequality (4), we deduce that:  
0 → t h , if   0 → χ .            ( 7 )  
                                                           
7 This is not the only possible assumption. An alternative assumption is that the central bank is a 
Stackelberg leader, and makes its policy choice taking into account how the evil agent will choose the 
specification errors (Leitemo and Söderström, 2008).   12
In other words, as the budget shrinks towards zero, the degree of misspecification 
approaches zero and hence θ  will approach infinity.  
In the following, we define the full transparency of monetary policy as a benchmark 
situation where the central bank communicates the exact value of θ  to the public, in other 
words, the variance of θ  is equal to zero ( 0
2 = θ σ ). When the variance of θ  is greater than 
zero ( 0
2 > θ σ ) and increases, central bank transparency decreases or alternatively central bank 
opacity increases. In order to simplify, we assume that θ  is independent of the cost shock  t e  
so that the covariance  ) , cov( θ t e  is zero.
8  
 
3. Optimal inflation targeting weight under transparent robust control 
 
The timing of the Stackelberg game between the government, the private sector and the 
central bank is as follows. First, each government sets the inflation targeting weight; second, 
the private sector forms its expectations about inflation; third, the central bank chooses the 
output gap. This game is solved by backward induction.  
The central bank implements the time-consistent discretionary monetary policy which is 
robust to model misspecifications. The min-max program (5) becomes: 











h x E L
t t
θ π τ λ − + + = ,           (8) 
subject to identical constraints as before. Under discretion, the central bank treats 
expectations of future inflation as given in setting  t x  and  t h . 
                                                           
8 This assumption is adopted for tractability reasons. An alternative assumption is that the parameter θ  is 
correlated with the cost shock  t e . It could be justified if the preference for robustness is related to forecast 
errors using the basic model. One would expect a central bank to be more averse to model misspecification if the 
shocks are larger. This is because the consequences are potentially more severe and the central bank’s loss 
function is quadratic.  
   13
The first-order conditions for the min-max problem are: 
0 ) 1 ( 0 = + + ⇒ =
∂
∂






,        (9) 






t h e x
h
L
θ τ δ τ .     (10) 
The second-order condition for the maximization program of evil agent puts a limit on the 
value of  θ  and is derived from condition (10) as follows: 










.                        (11) 
Inequality (11) implies that θ  should be at least greater than  τ + 1  for the min-max 
problem of the central bank to have a solution. 
Using equation (2) and (9) and (10), we obtain a difference equation of inflation rate: 
t t t t e
) 1 ( ) 1 (
] ) 1 ( [ ) 1 (
2









+ + − +
= Ε + .       (12)        
The only state variable in this model is the exogenous cost shock  t e . Under the rational 
expectations hypothesis, we solve for endogenous variables using the method of 
undetermined coefficients (McCallum, 1983). In accordance with this method, we guess that 
the solutions of  t π  and  1 + t t Eπ  take the following forms: 
t t e ζ π = ,             ( 1 3 )  
1 1 + + Ε = Ε t t t t e ζ π .                    ( 1 4 )  
Assuming that the private sector forms its rational expectations of  1 + Ε t tπ conditional on 
information available at t , we obtain: 
0 1 = Ε + t tπ .           ( 1 5 )  
 Taking account of (15), equations (9)-(10) and (12) can be solved jointly for equilibrium 
inflation rate, output gap and model misspecification as follows:   14
t t e
) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [
2 τ λ δ τ λ θ
θλ
π
+ − + +
= ,                    (16) 
t t e x
) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [
) 1 (
2 τ λ δ τ λ θ
τ δθ
+ − + +
+
− = ,                    (17)   
t t e h
) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [
) 1 (
2 τ λ δ τ λ θ
τ λ
+ − + +
+
= .                            (18)  
where  0 ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [
2 > + − + + τ λ δ τ λ θ  according to condition (11). The above solutions imply 
that current inflation rate and model misspecification positively (while output gap negatively) 
react to the inflation shock. 
Equation (18) shows that the degree of misspecification,  t h , is negatively related to θ .  
When  ∞ → θ , the central bank is certain about its economic model. In this case, solutions 
(16)-(18) become:  




= ,          (19) 






− = ,                      (20)   
0 = t h .          (21) 
The central bank is a risk-averse agent who wants to avoid particularly bad outcomes, 
and therefore needs policy to be robust against model misspecification that could have 
particularly severe consequences. Unambiguously, its preference for model robustness will 
affect the outcomes of macroeconomic variables.  
The equilibrium solutions of inflation rate, output gap and model misspecification react to 
the stochastic and unverifiable realization of inflation shocks. Central bank accountability 
modifies the effects of these shocks on endogenous variables as follows: 
0

















, if  0
2 < −θδ λ ,      (22)   15
0














,                        (23)   
0














.             (24)  
The effect of  t e on inflation is decreasing in τ  if the parameter θ  is large enough to 
ensure that  0
2 < −θδ λ . The effects of  t e on output gap and model misspecification are 
decreasing and increasing respectively in τ .  
For given τ , the effects of  t e  on these variables also depend on θ  as shown by the 
following derivatives:  
0

















,         if  0
2 < −θδ λ ,              (25) 
, 0
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.             (27)  
The effect of  t e  on inflation rate is decreasing in θ . This means that if the central bank 
has a lower preference for model robustness (higher θ ), it is less aggressive in response to 
inflation shocks.
9 The effects of  t e  on output-gap and model misspecification are increasing 
and decreasing respectively in θ . 
The government faces the trade-off between the need for accountability and the need for 
stabilization given that the central bank uses the robust control approach in implementing the 
targeting regime. The optimal inflation targeting weight is obtained by minimizing the social 
loss function (3) with respect to τ, taking account of equations (16)-(17). The first-order 
condition of the government minimization problem is: 
                                                           
9 See also Leitemo and Söderström (2008).   16























,       ( 2 8 )  
Deriving  t π  and  t x  given by (16) and (17) with respect to τ  and substituting the resulting 
derivatives as well as  t π  and  t x  given by (16) and (17) into the first-order condition (28), we 
obtain: 
0
} ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ {
) ( ) (
3 2







+ − + +
+
τ λ δ τ λ θ
θ λ λ τθδ t
t
e
E .        ( 2 9 )  






τ .                                               (30) 
The optimal solution of penalty implies that condition (6), i.e.  0 1 > +τ , is equivalent to the 
condition  0
2 < −θδ λ  that is used to obtain the result reported in (22). In the case where  





10 It follows from (30) that 







. These results are summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. When the central bank’s preference for model robustness is known with 
certainty ( 0
2 = θ σ ) by the government and the public, the optimal inflation targeting weight τ  
is negative and decreasing with the preference for model robustness. 
 
We remark that in the case of full transparency ( 0
2 = θ σ ) and in the absence of robust 




. According to 
                                                           
10 Following Walsh (2003), we can introduce in the loss function of the central bank, a parameter  t u , i.e. the 
mean zero period t realization of the net pressures for economic expansion. The realization of  t u is known by 
the central bank, although it is assumed to be unverifiable private information. Therefore, the optimal penalty   17
equation (25), when the central bank implements robust control approach (θ  decreases), the 
inflation rate increases and this implies higher social loss.  
Under model uncertainty, an increase in the penalty induced by a reduction of θ  will not 
necessarily attain the goal of reducing the inflation rate, since it has a double effect on 
inflation rate.  
Higher penalty incites the central bank to reduce the responses of inflation rate to 
inflation shock (direct effect) in favour of increased model misspecification, leading to higher 
inflation (indirect effect). Furthermore, a higher preference for model robustness (lower θ ) 
has also a positive effect on model misspecification, leading to higher inflation.  
In our analysis, the negative direct effect of a higher penalty on inflation is dominated by 
its indirect effect and the effect of higher preference for model robustness on model 
misspecifications. Consequently, the government will counterbalance the inflationary effect 
of higher preference for model robustness by decreasing the inflation targeting weight.  
In other words, our results imply that the government should appoint a liberal central 
banker, which is the opposite of the finding of Rogoff (1985). More uncertain the central bank 
is about its model, less weight the central bank should assign on inflation under optimal 
delegation. 
 
4. The effects of opacity about the preference for model robustness 
 
The results summarized in Proposition 1 are obtained under the assumption that 
information about the preference for model robustness is transmitted to the government and 
private agents. In the following, we relax this assumption in admitting that this information is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
will be  ) /( ] ) 2 [(
2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2
e u e u σ θδ σ λδ λσ σ θδ λδ λθδ τ + − + − =  with  0 / > ∂ ∂ θ τ  and  0 /
2 > ∂ ∂ u σ τ . The result is 
reduced to that of Walsh if  ∞ → θ  (i.e., in the absence of model misspecification): 
2 2 2 / ) ( lim e u σ σ δ λ τ
θ
+ =
∞ → .   18
private to the central bank. We then investigate whether the lack of transparency about the 
preference for model robustness can be used strategically by the central bank in order to 
reduce the penalty inflicted by the government. For this purpose, we will study the effects of 
opacity on the level and variability of inflation, output gap and model misspecification. 
 
4.1. Effects of opacity on the macroeconomic performance 
Substituting the solution of  t π  and  t x  given by equations (16) and (17) into expected 
social loss function (3) leads to  
.
} ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ {
) ]( ) 1 ( [
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The application of second-order Taylor approximation to the expected social loss function 
(31) yields  
2
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 } ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ {
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= e S L .          ( 3 2 )  
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τ λ δ τ λ θ
σ λ δ τ λ θ τ λ τ λ τ δ
+ − + +
+ + + + + + +
= Ω e . 
 
Proposition 2: For given τ , an increase in opacity deteriorates the social welfare in the case 
of serially uncorrelated inflation shocks. 
 
Proof: Using equation (32), deriving the social loss with regard to the degree of opacity leads 









 for  0
2 > e σ .    Q.E.D. 
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By increasing the robustness of monetary policy (decreasing θ ), the central bank can 
induce an increase in the optimal inflation targeting weight and hence its goal independence. 
Opacity about the preference for robustness can further increase (or not, depending on the 
initial conditions) its independence vis-à-vis the government. However, an increase in opacity 
is suboptimal from the point of view of government since it implies a higher social loss. In 
effect, for any given inflation targeting weight, opacity induces a higher volatility of inflation 
and output gap (see equations (31)-(32)). The government may be induced to decrease the 
inflation targeting weight in order to favour a reduction in model robustness. 
 
Proposition 3: Starting from the initial equilibrium characterized by full transparency 
( 0
2 = θ σ ), an increase in opacity about the preference for model robustness will incite the 




d ,  2 δ
λ θ > ∀ ), and 
will increase (reduce) the sensibility of inflation and model misspecification (output gap 
respectively) to the inflation shock.  
 




d ,  2 δ
λ θ > ∀  when  0





d , the effects of opacity on the sensibility of  t π  ,  t x  and  t h  can be shown by deriving 
equations (16)-(18) with respect to 
2
θ σ  as follows: 
0























,  since  0
2 < −θδ λ ; 
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.   Q.E.D. 
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Given the optimal solution of τ , i.e. equation (30), condition (6) is equivalent to 
assuming that  0
2 < −θδ λ  or  2 δ
λ θ > . The results concerning the sensibility of  t π ,  t x  and  t h  
to the inflation shock are closely linked to the negative effect of opacity on the inflation 
targeting weight decided by the government.  
If the central bank is opaque about its preference for model robustness, the resulting 
uncertainty increases the social loss as shown by Proposition 2 and therefore affects the 
government’s decision on the optimal inflation targeting weight. The optimal solution for the 
government is to reduce the penalty in order to counterbalance the negative effect of opacity 
on social welfare. In other words, if an increase in the preference for robustness is equivalent 
to gaining more independence for the central bank, the latter can increase further its 
independence by being opaque. 
Without opacity, the inflation shock positively affects the inflation rate and model 


















imply that opacity reinforces the sensibility of inflation and model misspecification to the 








x  implies that the sensibility of output gap to the inflation shock 
is reduced. 
 
4.2. Effects of opacity on the macroeconomic volatility  
To study how opacity affects the volatility of  t π , t x  and  t h , we calculate their variance by 
taking τ  as independent of the realisation of θ , i.e. their correlation is zero. In effect, τ  
depends only on the expected value and variance of θ . 
Using equations (16)-(18) and the second-order Taylor approximation, we obtain: 
{ }
2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 } ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( 2 { ) var( e t σ λ σ τ λ δ τ λ τ λ θ θ π θ
− − Θ + + + + + + Θ = ,           (33)   21
{ }
2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 ] ) 1 [( } ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( 2 { ) var( e t x σ δ τ σ τ λ δ τ λ τ λ θ θ θ + Θ + + + + + + Θ =
− − ,   (34) 
2 2 2 4 2 2 2 )] 1 ( [ } ] ) 1 ( [ 3 { ) var( e t h σ τ λ σ δ τ λ θ + Θ + + + Θ =
− − ,                   (35) 
where  ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [
2 τ λ δ τ λ θ + − + + = Θ . 
The volatility of  t π , t x  and  t h  is generated by the inflation shock. Opacity influences the 
volatility of these variables through the preference for model robustness and through its effect 
on the government’s decision about the inflation targeting weight.  
Denote that:  {} 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 6 ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) ( 2
) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( 2
θ σ λ θ τ λ τ θ λ τ δ θ λ δ θ λ λ δ θ θ
τ λ δ τ λ τ λ θ
+ + + + + + − + Θ − −
Θ + + + + + − = Ω  and 
3 2 2 3 3 2 2 2
2 2 2
2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 6 ) 1 ( ) 2 (
) ( 2
λ θ τ λ τ θ λ τ δ θ λ δ θ λ
λ δ θ θ
+ + + + + + −
Θ − = Φ .
11  The effects of opacity on macroeconomic 
volatility are summarized in the following proposition.
  
 




d < Ω  
and  0




d  and 
0
2 > Φ > θ σ . 
 
Proof: Deriving ) var( t π  given by equation (33) with respect to 
2
θ σ  yields: 
.
} 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 6 ) 1 ( ) 2 ( {
} ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( 2 { ) ( 2
) var( 2 2
2 5 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 2
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πt  respectively leads to conditions given in 
Proposition 4a.   Q.E.D. 
                                                            
11 It is easy to show that  0 > Φ  if  2 ] 1 [ 2 2 2 2 2 ) 1 (
2
) 1 (
6 > + + +







λ  and vice versa.   22
 
Proposition 4b: i) More opacity reinforces the volatility of output gap if  
. 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 3
2 2 2
} ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( 6 ) 1 ( 8 ) 1 ( )] 1 ( 2 [ ) 1 ( ) 2 ( { 2
} ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( 2 { ) 1 (
2
θ σ τ θ δλ τ θ δλ τ θ λ δ τ δλ τ θ τ λ θ δ λ δ θ θ δλ
τ λ δ τ λ τ λ θ τ δ
θ σ
τ
+ + + + + + + + − + + − + Θ




ii) More opacity reduces the volatility of output gap if the above condition is reversed. 
 
Proof: Deriving ) var( t x with respect to 
2
θ σ  leads to: 
{} . } ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( 2 { ) 1 ( 2                    
] ) 1 [(
} 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 6 ) 1 ( ) 2 ( {
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t x  respectively leads to conditions given in 
Proposition 4b.     Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 4c: i) More opacity reinforces the volatility of model misspecification if  
.
] ) 1 ( [ } )] 1 ( [ 2 ] ) 1 ( 3 ) 1 ( )[ ( { 3 2
] ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( 3
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
2
θ θ σ δ τ λ τ δ λ λ λ θ τ λδ τ λ λ θ δ θ λ
δ τ λ τ λ
σ
τ
+ + + + + + + + + − + Θ




ii) More opacity reduces the volatility of model misspecification if the above condition is 
reversed. 
 
Proof: Deriving ) var( t h with respect to 
2
θ σ  yields: 
[] { } . ] ) 1 ( [ } )] 1 ( [ 2 ] ) 1 ( 3 ) 1 ( )[ ( { 3 2
) 1 ( )] 1 ( [ ] ) 1 ( [ 3
) var(
2
2 2 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2






σ σ δ τ λ τ δ λ λ λ θ τ λδ τ λ λ θ δ λ θ









Θ + + + + + + + + + − + Θ
× + + + Θ + + =
∂
∂
   23










t h  respectively leads to conditions given in 
Proposition 4c.     Q.E.D. 
 
The results reported in Proposition 4 suggest that generally, if the inflation targeting 
weight does not respond too negatively to an increase in opacity, then the variance of inflation 
rate, output gap and model misspecification increases and vice versa.  
Having shown how opacity affects the level and volatility of economic variables, we can 
examine if there is a case for more opacity. When the central bank decided not to reveal 
private information about its preference for robustness, it accepted lower equilibrium inflation 
(and higher output gap) in exchange of greater macroeconomic instability. If the equilibrium 
level of inflation (and output gap) was increasing (and decreasing respectively) in opacity, 
there would be no such trade-off between the equilibrium level and volatility of inflation (and 
output gap) with respect to the degree of opacity. In the case where both inflation level and 
variability were increasing in opacity, the most desirable situation is that the central bank 
should be fully transparent ( 0
2 = θ σ ). Inversely, if both inflation and macroeconomic 
variability were decreasing in opacity, there would be a case for monetary policy opacity.  













d . Meanwhile, as shown by the 
part ii) of Proposition 4a, we have  0 2








d  and  0
2 > Φ > θ σ . For certain 









e  and  0 2





In this case, the trade-off is possible since the central bank that desires to reduce the inflation 
variability could accept an increase in the sensibility of inflation to the inflation shock.   24
On the other hand, the part i) of Proposition 4a) implies that  0 2









d < Ω  and  0
2 > Φ > θ σ . For certain expected degree of robustness and initial level of 









e  and  0 2




π . In this case, more 
transparency is preferable to opacity if initially the central bank is not perfectly transparent.  
 
5. Implications of a serially correlated inflation shock 
 
Our previous results are obtained under the assumption that the inflation shock is serially 
uncorrelated. In this section, we relax this assumption by assuming that the inflation shock is 
serially correlated and follows an AR(1) process: 
t t t e e ε ρ + = −1 ,   1 0 ≤ ≤ ρ  and  0 1 = − t t E ε   ;    (36) 
where  t ε  has mean zero and is serially uncorrelated.  
Using equations (14) and (36), we obtain: 
t t t t e ζρ π Ε = Ε +1 ,                    ( 3 7 )  
Substituting  1 + Ε t tπ  given by equation (37) into equation (12) leads to: 
t t t t e e
) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [
) 1 (
2 2 τ λ δ τ λ θ
λθ
ζρ
τ λ δ τ λ θ
θ τ βλ
π
+ − + +
+ Ε
+ − + +
− + −
= .      (38)   
Comparing the solution of  t π  given by (38) with that given by (13) yields: 
) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [
) 1 (
2 2 τ λ δ τ λ θ
λθ
ζρ
τ λ δ τ λ θ
θ τ βλ
ζ
+ − + +
+ Ε
+ − + +
− + −
= t .      (39) 
In the following, we will firstly discuss some implications of the introduction of a serially 
correlated inflation shock on the decision of inflation targeting weight in the benchmark case 
of full transparency. We will then examine, under opacity, how the persistence of inflation   25
shocks affects the sensibility of inflation, output gap and model misspecification to the 
current inflation shock. Since a closed-form solution of inflation targeting weight is not 
feasible, we are limited to discussing the likely impacts of the persistence of inflation shocks 
on the inflation targeting weight through its effect on the social loss function of the 
government.  
 
5.1. Full transparency 
Under full transparency, i.e.  ζ ζ = Εt , solving equation (39) leads to: 
2 ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( θδ τ βρ θ τ λ
λθ
ζ
+ + − − +
= ,             (40) 
where the denominator is positive since  0 1< − βρ  and  0 1 < − + θ τ .  
Substituting ζ  given by equation (40) into equation (13), we get: 
t t e 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( θδ τ βρ θ τ λ
λθ
π
+ + − − +
= ,         ( 4 1 )  
Using the solution of  t π  given by equation (41) in equation (9) to obtain the solution of 
t x   and inserting the latter into equation (10) to obtain  t h  yield: 
t t e x 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
) 1 (
θδ τ βρ θ τ λ
τ θδ
+ + − − +
+
− = ,       (42) 
t t e h 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
) 1 )( 1 (
θδ τ βρ θ τ λ
τ βρ λ
+ + − − +
+ −
= ,         ( 4 3 )  
By comparing equations (41)-(43) with their corresponding equations (16)-(18), we can 
easily find how, for given τ , the introduction of a serially correlated inflation shock modifies 
the sensibility of endogenous variables to the inflation shock.  
   26
Proposition 5: For given τ , the introduction of a serially correlated inflation shock implies a 
stronger response of current inflation and output gap to the inflation shock. However, it 
implies a weaker response of model misspecification to the inflation shock. 
 
Proof:  Deriving  t π ,   t x  and  t h  given respectively by (41), (42) and (43) with respect to ρ  
yields: 
0










θδ τ βρ θ τ λ






,         (44)    
0
] ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( [









θδ τ βρ θ τ λ





,     (45) 
0
















.        ( 4 6 )  
According to equations (16)-(18), in the absence of a serially correlated inflation shock, 
inflation and model misspecification positively react to the inflation shock while output gap 
negatively reacts to it. Comparing these results with these given by equations (44), (45) and 
(46) leads to Proposition 5.   Q.E.D. 
 
Deriving  t π  and  t x   given by (41) and (42) with respect to τ  and substituting the 
resulting derivatives as well as  t π  and  t x  given by (41) and (42) into the first-order condition 









2 .          ( 4 7 )  
The difference between the solution of τ  given by (47) and that given by (30) is equal to 
βρ
βρ
− 1 . Since  0 1 > − βρ , it follows that the optimal inflation targeting weight is higher in 
the case of a serially correlated inflation shock.    27
 
Proposition 6:  The optimal inflation targeting weight increases with the degree of 
persistence of inflation shocks.  
 
Proof: Deriving the solution of τ  given by equation (47) leads straightforwardly to 







τ .      Q.E.D. 
 
An increase in the persistence of inflation shocks will induce the government to increase 
the inflation targeting weight. Consequently, the central bank should assign a higher weight 
on inflation under optimal delegation. 
 
5.2. Opacity 
Under opacity, taking expectations of equation (39) and applying to the resulting equation 
the second-order Taylor approximation under the assumption of opacity, we obtain:
12 
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
] ) 1 [( ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( [
] ) 1 )[( 1 (
θ
θ
λρσ βδ λ δ τ τ δ τ θ βρ θ τ λ
σ λ δ τ τ λ λ θ
ζ
+ + + + Θ + + − − +
+ + + + Θ
= Εt ,      (48) 
Substituting  ζ t Ε  given by equation (48) into equations (37) and (38)  respectively yields: 
t t t e ρ
λρσ βδ λ δ τ τ δ τ θ βρ θ τ λ




2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
1 ] ) 1 [( ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( [
] ) 1 )[( 1 (
+ + + + Θ + + − − +
+ + + + Θ
= Ε + ,        (49) 
{ }
.
] ) 1 [( ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( [
] ) 1 )[( 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2










+ + + + Θ + + − − +
+ + + + Θ − +
+ − + +
−
= θ
λρσ βδ λ δ τ τ δ τ θ βρ θ τ λ
ρ σ λ δ τ τ λ λ θ θ τ β




θ   (50)    
Using the solution of  t π  given by equation (50) in equation (9) to obtain  t x  and inserting 
the latter in equation (10) to obtain  t h  lead to:   28
,
] ) 1 [( ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( [
} ] ) 1 )[( 1 ( { ) 1 (
) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [
) 1 (
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2







+ + + + Θ + + − − +
+ + + + Θ − +
+ − + +
+
= θ
λρσ βδ λ δ τ τ δ τ θ βρ θ τ λ
ρ σ λ δ τ τ λ λ θ θ τ β
τ λ δ τ λ θ
τ δ
θ
θ  (51) 
.
] ) 1 [( ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( [
) 1 (
) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [
) 1 (
2 2 2 2 2 2
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+ + + + Θ + + − − +
Θ −
+ − + +
+
=
θ λρσ βδ λ δ τ τ δ τ θ βρ θ τ λ
βρ
τ λ δ τ λ θ
λ τ   (52) 
Examining the effect of interaction between ρ  and 
2
θ σ  on the sensibility of  t π ,  t x  and 
t h  to the serially correlated inflation shock leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 7: For given τ , an increase in opacity will induce an increase in the sensibility 
of inflation and output gap to the serially correlated inflation shock but a decrease in that of 
model misspecification if 
ρλ βδ λ δ τ τ
θ λ δ θ λ τ
θ σ 2 2 2
2 2
] ) 1 [( ) 1 (
] ) )( 1 [( 2 0
+ + +
− − + Ξ < <  and  2 ) 1 (








− + < . The effect of 
opacity will be reversed either if 
ρλ βδ λ δ τ τ
θ λ δ θ λ τ
θ σ 2 2 2
2 2
] ) 1 [( ) 1 (
] ) )( 1 [( 2
+ + +
− − + Ξ >  and  2 ) 1 (








− + <  or if     
2 ) 1 (








− + > , 0
2 ≥ ∀ θ σ .  
 
Proof: Deriving twice  t π  given by (50) with respect to ρ  and 
2
θ σ  leads to: 
.
} ] ) 1 [( ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( [ {
} ] ) 1 [( ) 1 ( {
               
) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [
] ) 1 )[( 1 )( 1 (
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) 1 (
2 t
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] ) 1 [( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( θ σ λρ βδ λ δ τ τ ρ θ τ βλ
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+ − + + λ τ δ τ λ θ
λθ
) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ 2 t
2 3 2 2 1
] ) 1 )[( 1 ( θ σ λ δ τ τ λ λ θ
− −
Θ + + + + Θ .    29
In the above derivatives, we find that one common term determines their sign: i.e. 
ρ βδ τ θ βρ τ λ δ τ λ θ
2 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( } ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ { + − − + − + + = Ξ . If  2 ) 1 (








− + < , we have 






























t h  






t h  leads directly to conditions given in Proposition 7.    Q.E.D. 
 
We have found that, for given τ  and under full transparency, the introduction of a serially 
correlated inflation shock implies a stronger response of current inflation and output gap to 
the inflation shock but a weaker response of model misspecification. When we take account 
of opacity, according to the degree of persistence and the initial degree of opacity, the 
reaction of these variables could be stronger or weaker.  
Substituting the solutions of  t π  and  t x  given by equations (50) and (51) into the expected 
social loss function (3) leads to the following single period social loss: 
{}
.
] ) 1 [( ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( [
] ) 1 )[( 1 ( ) 1 (
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    (53) 
In the loss function (53), the fraction including ρ  is negative since  0 ) 1 ( < − + θ τ  and 
0 ) 1 ( < − βρ . The effects of a serially correlated inflation shock on the social loss function 
under opacity are summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 8: i) For given τ , an increase in persistence is always associated with higher 
social loss. ii) When the degree of persistence is small enough, the influence of persistence on 
the social loss is reinforced by opacity if the initial degree of opacity is sufficiently small and   30
vice versa. When the degree of persistence is large enough, an increase in opacity always 
reduces the effect of persistence on social loss.  
 
Proof:  See Appendix B.       
 
Without giving a closed-form solution, we can however conjecture about the effect of a 
serially correlated inflation shock on the decisions of the government about the optimal 
inflation targeting weight under opacity. 
Central bank opacity and the persistence of inflation shocks, while both increasing the 
social loss, have opposite effects on the decision of the government about the inflation 
targeting weight. The first, by increasing the social loss, is sub-optimal for the government 
and incites the latter to reduce the optimal inflation targeting weight. The second induces the 
government to make the opposite decision by reinforcing the sensibility of inflation and 
output gap to the inflation shock and hence their volatility.  
The introduction of persistence, by further increasing the social loss, will not 
substantially modify the nature of the government’s decision problem but can change the 
level of the effects of opacity on the optimal inflation targeting weight.  
The second part of Proposition 8 suggests that an increase in opacity allows reducing the 
effect of persistence on social loss when the degree of persistence is large. It implies that high 
persistence of inflation shocks might increase the incentive for the central bank to be more 
opaque in order to induce the government to reduce the inflation targeting weight. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
   31
In this paper, we have examined the accountability issue in a framework of delegation 
where government and private agents are subject to uncertainty about the preference for 
model robustness of the central bank, while the latter faces model uncertainty. More 
precisely, we have studied the implications of these two kinds of uncertainty for the 
accountability of the central bank as well as for macroeconomic performance and volatility. 
If the inflation shock is serially uncorrelated, in the benchmark case of full transparency 
and in the absence of robust control, it is not necessary to impose any penalty. This result is 
explained by the fact that we do not introduce an inflation bias in the loss function of the 
central bank. 
If the central bank uses robust control techniques in monetary policy decision, any 
increase in the preference for model robustness leads to a lower inflation targeting weight. 
Our results imply that the government should appoint a liberal central banker, which is the 
opposite of the finding of Rogoff (1985). More uncertain the central bank is about its model, 
less weight the central bank should assign on inflation under optimal delegation.  
For every given level of inflation targeting weight, an increase in opacity deteriorates the 
social welfare since opacity induces a higher volatility of inflation and output gap.  The 
central bank which lacks goal independence in the framework of delegation may try to 
gain more independence by being opaque about its preference for model robustness. Under 
opacity, the government may be induced to decrease the inflation targeting weight in order to 
favour a reduction in model robustness.  
The macroeconomic performance depends on the relationship between the inflation 
targeting weight and the degree of opacity. As this relationship is negative for a small initial 
degree of opacity, more opacity increases the sensibility of inflation and model 
misspecification to the inflation shock but reduces that of output gap. In terms of 
macroeconomic volatility, we have shown that the volatility of inflation, model   32
misspecification and output gap could be increased or decreased if the initial degree of 
opacity is higher enough. Under some conditions, there could be cases for more opacity. 
Finally, if the inflation shock is serially correlated, our study suggests that the inflation 
targeting weight increases with the persistence of shock under full transparency. It implies a 
stronger response of current inflation and output gap but a weaker response of model 
misspecification to the inflation shock.  An increase in opacity will induce an increase in the 
sensibility of inflation and output gap to the inflation shock but a decrease in that of model 
misspecification if the initial degree of opacity and the degree of persistence are both small 
enough. If the persistence is sufficiently high, the effect of opacity could be reversed 
independently of the initial degree of opacity. An increase in persistence is always associated 
with higher social loss and its influence could be reinforced by an increase in opacity if the 
initial degree of opacity is sufficiently small and inversely. When the degree of persistence is 
large enough, an increase in opacity always reduces the effect of persistence on social loss. 
These results suggest that the effects of opacity on the optimal inflation targeting weight 
could be reinforced or weakened according to the initial degree of opacity and/or degree of 
persistence. 
 




τ  (Proposition 3) 
Denote ) 1 ( τ + = T . The second-order Taylor approximation of the expected social loss 
function (31) is given as follows: 
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The first-order condition of the government minimization problem is:    33
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Simplifying successively without breaking the term  ) (
2 λ δ θ −  leads to: 
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According to equation (11), we have  T = + > τ θ 1 . That implies  0 ) (
2 > + + − δ λ θ λ T T . 
Multiplying condition (A.2) by 
5 2 ] ) ( [ λ δ λ θ T T − +  and eliminating 
2 ) ( t e E , we can rewrite 
equivalently condition (A.2) as: 
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      (A.6) 
Condition (A.4) and equations (A.5) and (A.6) allow us to find the relationship between 
the penalty (τ ) and the degree of opacity (
2
θ σ ).  
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  (A.7) 
In the following, we only examine the solution obtained at the equilibrium where the 
initial value of opacity is zero (i.e.  0
2 = θ σ ). Since the optimal solution for the inflation 
targeting weight is  2 δ θ






λ τ − = − = + = T  and 
consequently  T θ δ λ δ θ
2 2 ) ( = − .  Using the condition  0
2 = θ σ  and substituting  ) (
2 λ δ θ −  by 
T θ δ
2  into (A.7) except for the term 
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Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 8 
Denoting  τ + =1 T  and deriving 
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t L , i.e. the effect of an increase in ρ  on 
S
t L  is always positive. 
Deriving  ρ ∂
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The sign of  2
2
θ σ ρ∂ ∂
∂ S
t L  is easy to determine if the following expressions have the same sign:  
1) 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 ) ( ] ) 1 ( [ )] 3 2 ( ) 1 )( ( 2 [ θ σ λ δ ρλ βδ λ δ θ βρ θ δ βρ θ λ + − − + − + − − = T T T T T T K  ;  
2) 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 ) ( ] ) 1 ( )][ 2 1 ( ) 1 )( ( [ θ ρσ βλδ λ δ λ δ θ βρ δ θ βρ θ λ + − − + − + − − = T T T T T T K . 
If  1 K  and  2 K  have opposite sign, it will be difficult to give a closed-form conditions 
under which the sign of  2
2
θ σ ρ∂ ∂
∂ S
t L  is well specified.  
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Furthermore, examining  1 K  and  2 K , we find that the first term in these two expressions 
will be negative if the persistence of inflation shock is sufficiently high, i.e.: 
ρ
δ θ θ λ β













θ σ ∀  .   







t L . Q.E.D. 
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